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Abstract
In this paper, the reimbursement of spending on medicin is considered as
a problem of insurance, where the loss due to illness of the insured is covered
totally or partially by an insurance company (which may be the government).
The presence of moral hazard (in the form of the individual patient’s own
effort to reduce cost by avoiding unnecessary medicination and choosing the
cheapest drugs) implies that an optimal insurance will have less than total
coverage of the patient outlays.
The insurance approach to drug subsidization indicates that reimburse-
ment should vary with the type of medicin rather than with accumulated pa-
tient outlays. Also, secondary investment covering the remaining part of the
patient’s outlays, a feature of the reimbursement system in some countries, is
suboptimal.
1. Introduction
In recent years, the rules for subsidization of drug consumption has been
a eld of concern, which has mainly originated in the steady growth of
the burden on the public nances caused by this subsidization. Attempts
at reducing the growing public outlays for drug subsidization have taken
the form of price regulation, agreements with industry, and recently also
a restructuring of the set of rules for drug subsidization. As a result
of this reform, the subsidization will no longer be on a at rate of 50%
or 75% depending on the degree of urgency of the prescribed drug, but
rather a subsidization which for the individual depends on the accumulated
consumption in each given period.
In the discussion of the technicalities of rule formation, the basic
purpose of drug subsidization has tended to slip out of the eld of interest;
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hagen, Blegdamsvej 5, DK-2200 Copenhagen K.
e-mail address: H.Keiding@pubhealth.ku.dk
1
the concern about public nances has outweighed other concerns.
In oÆcial reports
2
it is stated that the purpose of drug subsidization is
to guarantee that patients will not be excluded from relevant treatment by
drugs for economic reasons, a statement which in the sequel is elaborated
into a list of demands of a rational system of drug subsidization
3
. It
follows from this that special concern should be given to patients with a
particularly great need of treatment, and that the system should support a
\professionally and economically appropriate pattern of drug prescriptions".
Furthermore it should enhance competition in the drug market as far as
possible, but it should also be easy to use from the point of view of
administration and transparent for all persons and institutions involved.
As it can be seen, there are rather many dierent objectives of the
system, and any particular proposal is bound to perform weakly in at least
some of these. Anyhow, as was perhaps to be expected, there is very little
mention of these objectives in the new proposal for a law on subsidization
of the drug consumption
4
.
In the present paper, we consider this problem of designing an optimal
drug subsidization scheme. In doing so, it is rather natural to take as a
point of departure the literature on optimal taxes and subsidies. However,
the present eld is special from at least one point of view: Drug consumption
is consumption under uncertainty, consumption of contingent commodities,
namely drugs in the case of illness. Therefore, it is a eld where insurance
comes in a natural way: The government subsidizing drug consumption is
essentially providing the public with an insurance. The fact that individuals
pay no premium alters little or nothing in this picture. This being so,
the theory of insurance seems to be the obvious tool for analyzing optimal
subsidization, and once we are there, the problems of adverse selection and
(in particular) moral hazard must be faced. It turns out that presence of
moral hazard may explain some of the actual patterns in drug subsidization,
but on the other hand, if moral hazard is a problem of some importance,
then the rules (the actual as well as the proposed new ones) do not cope
with it in the proper way.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we consider the basic
insurance-theoretic approach to drug subsidization. Then, in Section 3,
we discuss some of the more obvious deviations from the rules for optimal
insurance which can be observed in practice. In Section 4, the model is
extended to the situation of several risks rather than a single one. We
conclude in Section 5 with some comments on the applicability of this
2 Here taken from: Udfordringer på lægemiddelområdet [1998], p.139
3 Ibid., p.140.
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approach.
2. The drug reimbursement system as an insurance contract under
moral hazard
As well-known, (cf. e.g. Borch [1990], Arrow [1963]) the optimal contract
between a risk neutral insurance company and a risk averse customer is
that where the company repays the full amount of the loss suered by the
insured except possibly for a constant, which does not depend on the size
of the loss suered. The insurance contracts of real life are however not
often of this type, but contain elements of coinsurance and risk-sharing
between company and insured. In many or even most cases, this is due to
the presence of asymmetric information in one or more of its several versions.
When information is not evenly distributed between insurer and insured, one
of the parties, and in this context usually the insured, knows more about
individual risk and eort to avoid or reduce losses than does the company.
This type of market failure induced by the dierences in information of
the parties involved gives rise to contracts which depart from the simple
principles governing insurance in an informationally perfect world.
In our discussion here we focus on a particular version of asymmetric
information, namely moral hazard, where the probability of loss { and in our
context this means the probability of having outlays for medicine { can be
inuenced by the insured, although at the cost of an individual eort. The
exposition below follows Shavell [1979], see also Winter [1992].
In the following we consider a simplied situation, where the insured
(the patient) has an initial wealth W and is subjected to the risk of a loss
of L (interpreted as the payment for medicine which is a consequence of an
illness). The probability of the loss is p(e), where e is the individual eort
of the insured to reduce her own risk. This eort is (in our present very
simple model) treated as an outlay for the insured, so that eort costs r $
per unit.
Assume that an insurance is oered at the premium , which provides a
reimbursement Q of the loss L. We may think of this insurance as provided
by the public sector or by a private company, or it may alternatively be
an insurance scheme administered collectively by a group of insured. As it
appears from the formalism introduced so far, we assume that all insured
are identical in the sense that L, Q, p(e), and r are the same for all.
If each of the insured are endowed with a (von Neumann-Morgenstern)
utility function U dened on the possible levels of nal wealth, we get that
the optimal insurance scheme { constructed in such a way that the insured
are as well o as possible { will be found by choosing , Q and e such that
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expected utility
p(e)U(W      re  L+Q) + (1  p(e))U(W      re)
is maximized under the constraints
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(1)
where we have used the notation W
L
(e) =W    re L+Q for wealth in
the case of loss at the eort level e, and correspondinglyW
N
(e) =W  re
for wealth without loss at eort level e (the dependence on e is explicit in our
notation, but W
L
and W
N
depend of course also on the other parameters
of the model, in particular ).
The rst constraint is the so-called incentive compatibility property:
The level of eort chosen by the insured in order to keep down her risk of
loss is the one which is the most advantageous for the insured (if not she
would have chosen another level, since this is what cannot be observed by
the company). The second constraint is a break-even condition, stating that
the scheme must not give rise to budget losses for the company, so that the
premium must be large enough to cover average losses.
Rewriting the incentive compatibility condition, which states that e
maximizes expected utility given  and Q, using Kuhn-Tucker conditions
for constrained optimization, we get that either
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(3)
The incentive compatibility constraint may be used to dene optimal e as a
function e(Q) of Q, which together with  = p(e)Q may be inserted in the
expression for expected utility, so that the latter depends only on Q. First
order condition for maximum is then
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0
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0
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0
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  p[(1  p)U
0
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0
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L
)] + pU
0
(W
L
) = 0;
(4)
where the three members of the expression on the right hand side have
an interpretation as expected utility gain from an increase in the coverage
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by one $ from either (i) change in premium resulting from a changed
reimbursement level per $ premium, (ii) change in premium caused by higher
coverage, or (iii) change of coverage.
How large then is the optimal coverage? That of course depends on
the parameters; when the cost r of reducing risk is very high, it will never,
that isfor all levels of coverage, pay to choose an eort level diering from
0. But if cost r is reasonably low, the optimal coverage may well be below
L. Clearly it is in particular this kind of optimal solutions which are of
interest for our discussion; if full coverage is optimal, then the discussion of
moral hazard and of inducing risk-reducing behavior among the insured is
obviously of minor interest, since anyway it would not be rational for society
to have the insured choosing eort levels dierent from 0. In the sequel, we
assume therefore that the optimal scheme provides for non-zero eort levels
of the individuals.
3. Second-best optimum for the insurance problem with moral
hazard
In the previous section we have described the basic insurance problem of
medicine cost reimbursement and its socially optimal solution. As always,
this is the scheme which would be chosen in an idealized situation where a
benevolent planner makes the right insurance { specied by the optimal 
and Q { available for the citizens.
In real life there are however further constraints caused by the actual
institutions in society, and it may well happen that the insurance scheme
which is chosen diers from the socially optimal one. In our present case we
may think of at least two reasons for such a discrepancy:
(a) Budget constraints in the insurance company: As already mentioned, the
health care nancing authorities are usually not an insurance company in
the usual sense of this word, since the premium is not collected directly
from the individuals but are obtained indirectly through the tax payments
of the citizens. As a consequence, the cost covering constraint, which we
used in the previous section, and which gave us the simple relationship
between premium and coverage, from which the company was free to choose
any combination, lacks realism; rather than having a free choice (with due
consideration of the individuals' choices) the company will be constrained by
a budget given from above, meaning that average cost of reimbursement of
losses should not exceed some given xed amount. With this reformulation,
we get a constraint of the form
p(e)Q    
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in a second-best optimization problem, where  is the exogenously given
budget constraint.
In this new situation it may of course happen that the new constraint
is not binding, so that the socially optimal coverage Q

with associated
eort level e

already satises p(e

)Q

 . However, the interesting case
is of course the one where p(e

)Q

> , corresponding to a wish of higher
coverage with the individuals than what they can actually get, since this
would demand too large outlays by the company. In the solution of the
second-best optimization problem an eort level e
0
and a coverage Q
0
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determined as solution of
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where

W
L
(e) = W      re   L + Q,and W
N
(e) = W      re, together
with the condition
p(e)Q = 
Since our solution diers from the socially optimal one in having a
smaller coverage (Q
0
< Q

according to our assumption), it is to be expected
that the associated eort levels e

and e
0
satisfy the relation e

> e
0
(since
it is impossible to get as much coverage as wanted, the individuals substitute
from insurance to risk-reducing eort). In our model, it is possible to check
our intuition by looking at a small reduction in the premium from the
socially optimal level and keeping track of the coverage, which at premium
 will be given as =p(e). Considering the function
f(e; ) =
1
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N
(e; )]
  (1  p(e))U
0
(W
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(e; )  p(e)U
0
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(e; ))
we have that f(e; ) = 0 when e satises the incentive compatibility
constraint at premium  and coverage =p(e). The partial derivative of
f w.r.t.  is
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which is positive as each of its two members is greater than 0, the rst
one since p
0
(e) < 0 and the second one since U
00
< 0 (U is assumed to be
concave) and jU
00
j is decreasing as a function of W .
By the same kind of reasoning we nd the partial derivative w.r.t. e as
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where each of the members on the right hand side is < 0 (here we use that
U and p are concave functions, so that the partial derivatives are negative.
Using the Implicit Function Theorem we get that in a neighborhood of
e

, e may we written as a decreasing function of  (given that coverage is
determined residually as =p(e)).
We may now, as contended, conclude that the optimal eort level e
0
in the budget constrained solution is greater than the eort level associated
with the socially optimal solution e

. In our application, where eort is
directed towards preventing illness with its consequences in the form of
costly medicine consumption (or perhaps rather towards reducing cost of the
medicine consumption once the illness has actually occurred { we have here
a distinction between ex ante and ex post moral hazard, which have the same
consequences in our crude model but might be given a separate treatment
in a more detailed model), the higher eort might be interpreted as a better
prevention of illness resulting in an overall higher level of health, so that
there is an unexpected benet of the budget constraint. Unfortunately, if
health has a value per se, then there would be a high eort level even in the
socially optimal solution, and the general conclusion, that the individuals
put up more eort (waste more resources in prevention of illness) than what
is socially eÆcient, will still hold true. Also, it should not be forgotten that
the individual eort may well take the form of using other parts of the health
care system (than consumption of medicine), so that a greater level of eort
may result in greater outlays in other parts of the public system.
(b) Several insurance companies: The problem treated as far has been a
rather typical second-best problem, which in principle would arise in all
situations where an optimal solution has to be implemented by a suitable
mechanism, but there is an additional complication in our present context
of insurance under moral hazard, connected with the possible presence of
additional possibilities of insuring against outlays related to medicine. As a
matter of fact, such additional insurance is available in Denmark, provided
by the non-prot organization \Sygeforsikringen Danmark".
Assume that in the situation previously considered, where the individ-
ual is oered an insurance scheme with coverage Q and premium , there is
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an additional company oering insurance against the residual loss L Q at
a premium 
0
, which is such that average cost is covered, that is satisfying

0
 p(e
0
)q
0
;
where e
0
is the eort level chosen by the individual who is insured both by
the original scheme and by the new supplementary one.
First of all we should check whether the individual does actually want
this insurance, that is whether she is better o with the two schemes than
with only one. This can be done with the tools already developed, by
checking whether the utility U of the individual increases if the coverage q
in the supplementary insurance gets larger than 0, and the latter question
can be answered by the same arguments as those leading to (4), so that we
get
@EU
@q


q=0
=  p[(1  p)U
0
(W
N
) + pU
0
(W
L
)] + pU
0
(W
L
):
If we assume that @EU=@Q  0 (so that the rst insurance is either optimal
or has a coverage which is smaller than the socially optimal), then it is
seen by comparison of the above expression with (4) that the dierence is
the rst member on the right hand side in (4), which is negative. In other
words, we man conclude that @EU=@q > 0, at least for small values of the
supplementary coverage.
A consequence of this is that the nal combined choice of insurance
in society becomes suboptimal { even if the rst scheme were chosen
in an optimal way, it would be individually rational to substitute from
risk reduction to insurance. We have here a problem of over-insurance,
which reduces the incentive for individual eort to reduce risk. If the
supplementary insurance is designed to provide full coverage of residual loss,
the associated optimal eort level will be 0.
4. The Ramsey pricing problem of dierentiated subsidies
In the previous sections we have assumed throughout that there was a
well-dened money loss L connected with medicine consumption caused by
illness, but that the risk of suering this loss could be partially controlled by
the individual using the eort variable e. Among the many ways in which
this rather primitive model can be rened is allowing for the possibility of
several dierent losses (presumably connected with dierent kinds of illness
and accordingly with dierent prescriptions of medicine). Thus, we assume
that there are several uncertain events, each with its associated money loss
L
i
and independent eort-determined risks p
i
(e
i
), i = 1; : : : ; n. Assuming
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for simplicity that the risks are so small that the case of two dierent
events occurring simultaneously may be disregarded, the expected utility
obtained in n dierent insurance schemes, each providing insurance against
a particular of the n uncertain events, with premium 
i
and coverageQ
i
, and
with eort towards reducing the risk of the ith event being e
i
, i = 1; : : : ; n,
is given by
n
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where we have put  = 
1
+   + 
n
, e = e
1
+   + e
n
.
As previously, in the search for a social optimum attention should be
paid to incentive compatibility for the individual on the one side and balance
of premium and expected losses for the company on the other side. The
incentive compatibility condition states that the eort levels (e
1
; : : : ; e
n
) at
given 
i
and Q
i
will be chosen in such a way that individual expected utility
is maximal.
The rst order conditions for this maximum are now
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which are the counterparts of (2) and (3) above. Once again the solution of
the incentive constraints gives us the eort levels (e
1
; : : : ; e
n
) as a function
of Q
1
; : : : ; Q
n
, and the optimal coverage will be that which maximizes EU
with respect to Q
1
; : : : ; Q
n
, when the eort levels are regulated by incentive
compatibility and the premia are such that
n
X
i=1
p
i
(e
i
)Q
i
(10)
9
(only the sum of the premia matter { we assume here that all risks are
insured of by the same company).
We remark that the optimal eort against loss caused by the ith event
depends on Q
j
for j 6= i in a very indirect way (through a change in the
level of average utility), so that optimal eort e
i
may be considered as a
function of only Q
i
,
e
i
= e
i
(Q
i
): (11)
This means that we can derive a rst order condition for optimality
corresponding to (4) by dierentiating (7) (with (10) and (11) inserted,
whereby we (using (8)) get
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The three members of this expression have interpretations corresponding
to those of (4). When there are several dierent losses, there is now an
additional condition, stating that marginal utility of decreasing risk should
be the same for all the dierent losses. In our context of insurance against
outlays caused by illness this means that the optimal coverages should be
determined in such a way that individual eort towards reduction of loss
balances with insurance cost in each of the schemes, or, otherwise put, the
subsidies of each type of medicine should be determined in accordance with
the possibilities of individual risk reduction related to the kind of illness at
which this medicine is prescribed.
The latter conclusion remains also when a budget constrained insurance
company is considered. In a second-best optimum under a constraint of the
form
n
X
i=1
p
i
(e
i
)Q
i
 
expected utility is maximized w.r.t. Q
1
; : : : ; Q
n
after insertion of the incen-
tive compatibility conditions. It is easily seen that the expression for the
partial derivative of EU w.r.t. Q
i
becomes quite simple, namely
@EU
@Q
i
= p
i
(e
i
)U
0
(W
L
i
); (12)
which is the expected utility gain from having 1 $ additional coverage of loss
in case of event i. In (second-best) optimum the marginal utilities w.r.t. Q
i
must be identical.
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This rule bears some resemblance to the well-known Ramsey rule for
public pricing using inverse elasticities (cf. e.g. Bos [1989]). What matters
is average utility, and it is conceivable that even large losses are only
reimbursed to a small degree, namely if they either occur with very small
probability or if the individual may avoid them with only minor eort.
5. Concluding comments
As it has been said repeatedly, the analysis of the previous sections has
been quite primitive, treating individual illness as an uncertain event with a
denite probability and giving rise to a well-determined money loss. On the
other hand, this very crude approach to the problem of medicine outlays and
reimbursement of these outlays has the advantage of being tractable in the
sense that it is possible to derive conclusions which provide some orientation
for practical policy, and which may be compared to the actual policy in the
eld of medicine subsidies.
The Danish debate on subsidization of the medicine consumption of the
population has tended to revolve around a few basic principles, which seem
not to have been contested or even debated through the years { the system
should be simple, meaning that at-rate subsidies are preferable to elaborate
systems of subsidization, and it should enhance the price consciousness of the
consumers through a larger individual co-payment. As it can be seen, these
basic principles are not supported by the model in the previous sections: If
subsidies are to be designed in such a way that it conforms as well as possible
with the demand for insurance of the individual against unexpected medical
cost, with due consideration to the incentive structure and the need for
individual eort to prevent illness and reduce its cost, then a dierentiated
system is superior to a at-rate system, since it can be tailored to the specic
conditions of the dierent cases of illness with associated medicine outlays.
The budget constrained illness insurance company seems to be an
unfortunate construction from the point of view of optimal allocation, since
the budget considerations of the company distorts this allocation in the
direction of too much eort being directed to individual risk reduction or
cost containment. Since budget constraints seem to be unavoidable in public
administration, the Danish institutional arrangement, where reimbursement
of medicine outlays is taken care of by regional government, must probably
be considered as less satisfactory; an independent organization, nanced
after other principles than lump-sum budgeting, would be preferable.
Before jumping to conclusion it might of course be worth the while
to develop the model somewhat further, freeing it from some of its more
unfortunate restrictions, among which are the concentration upon risk
11
reduction rather than ex post cost reduction (in the sense of e.g. Ehrlich
and Becker [1973]). This will be the theme of further research in the eld.
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